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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h)
(1990).

(1989), or Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j)

Jurisdiction in the Utah Supreme Court prior to transfer

was proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the trial court's factual finding that appellee was

not negligent against the clear weight of the evidence?
Standard of review: A trial court's finding of fact will only
be set aside by a reviewing court if it is against the clear weight
of the evidence, or the reviewing

court otherwise

reaches a

"definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Smith
v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 124 (Utah App. 1990).

A

finding of fact is clearly erroneous "only if the finding is without
adequate evidentiary support or is induced by an erroneous view of
the law."
2.

Id.
Did

the

trial

court

correctly

determine,

as

an

alternative ground, that appellant's cause of action arose out of
an inherent risk of skiing, and was thus barred under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-53?
Standard of review:

The trial court's determination was

interpretation of a statute in light of findings of fact.
1

The

court's interpretation of the statute is reviewed for correctness.
Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, 789 P.2d
34, 37 (Utah App. 1990).

The court's underlying finding of fact

will be upheld unless clearly erroneous.

Smith v. Linmar Energy

Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah App. 1990).
3.

Did the trial court err in its award of costs to

defendant?
Standard of review:

The lower court's award of costs is

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

Lloyd's Unlimited

v. Nature's Way, 753 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah App. 1988).

STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 63-11-37.

Passenger tramways - Purpose and scope

of act.
In order to safeguard the life, health, property and
welfare of the citizens of Utah while using passenger
tramways, as defined in Section 63-11-38, it shall be
the policy of the state to protect its citizens and
visitors from unnecessary mechanical hazards in the
design, construction and operation of passenger
tramways, but not from the hazards inherent in the
sports of mountaineering, skiing and hiking, or from the
hazards of the area served by such passenger tramways,
all of which hazards are assumed by the skier or other
sportsman; and that periodic inspections be required of
passenger tramways with a view to assuring that each one
of them meets "The United States of America Standard
Institute Safety Code for Aerial Passenger Tramways,"
or equivalent. The state, through the Passenger Tramway
Safety Board, shall register all passenger tramways in
the state, establish reasonable standards of design,
construction and operational practices and cause to be
2

made such inspection as may be necessary in carrying
this policy into effect•
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51.

Inherent risks of skiing - Public

policy.
The Legislature finds that the sport of skiing is
practiced by a large number of residents of Utah and
attracts a large number of nonresidents, significantly
contributing to the economy of this state. It further
finds that few insurance carriers are willing to provide
liability insurance protection to ski area operators and
that the premiums charged by those carriers have risen
sharply in recent years due to confusion as to whether
a skier assumes the risks inherent in the sport of
skiing. It is the purpose of this act, therefore, to
clarify the law in relation to skiing injuries and the
risks inherent in that sport, to establish as a matter
of law that certain risks are inherent in that sport,
and to provide that, as a matter of public policy, no
person engaged in that sport shall recover from a ski
operator for injuries resulting from those inherent
risks.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-52. Inherent risks of skiing - Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers or
conditions which are an integral part of the sport of
skiing, including, but not limited to: changing weather
conditions, variations of steepness in terrain; snow or
ice conditions; surface or subsurface conditions such
as bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, impact with
lift towers and other structures and their components;
collisions with other skiers; and a skier's failure to
ski within his own ability.
(2) "Injury" means any personal injury or property
damage or loss.
(3) "Skier" means any person present in a ski area for
the purpose of engaging in the sport of skiing.
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(4) "Ski area" means any area designated by a ski area
operator to be used for skiing.
(5) "Ski area operator" means those persons, and their
agents, officers, employees or representatives, who
operate a ski area.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-53.

Inherent risks of skiing - Bar against

claim or recovery from operator for injury from risks inherent in
sport.
Notwithstanding anything in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-274 3 to the contrary, no skier may make any claim against,
or recover from, any ski area operator for injury
resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of The Case and Course of Proceedings
This personal injury action arose out of an accident at
Brighton Ski Resort in which appellant was struck by a ski lift
chair.

The action was tried to the bench on April 26-27, 1989.

The trial court took the matter under advisement, and subsequently
determined that the evidence showed that appellee, Brighton, did not
breach any duty to appellant.
As an alternative ground for finding no cause of action
against Brighton, the trial court found that appellant's claims
arose solely due to the negligence of other skiers, and were thus
barred by the "inherent risks of skiing" statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-53.
4

The trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment against appellant on June 2, 1989.

The judgment

included an award of costs to Brighton, in accordance with a
memorandum of costs submitted by Brighton.

Statement of Facts
The appellant, Hale, was supervising a group of 14-year-old
boys who were skiing at Brighton Ski Resort. (R.103 at 5, 15.) Two
of the boys were immediately behind Hale in the lift line waiting
to load onto the lift chairs. (R.103 at 111.)

The ski lift

transports skiers up the mountain in two-passenger lift chairs.
Skiers preparing to load the lift wait behind a designated line
until it is their turn to load.

At that time, the skiers move

forward into the loading area and await the arrival of the lift
chair, which comes around a circular bullwheel and approaches from
behind.
On this occasion, the boys were not paying attention and/or
became confused as to which lift chair they were supposed to take,
and entered the loading area too early. (R.103 at 95-96, 108, 121,
124, 315.) The lift operator knew that if the boys were not pushed
back, the lift chair would hit the boys from the side and would then
hit appellant. (R.103 at 150.)

In this emergency situation, the

operator made a split-second decision.
5

He jumped and pushed the

boys out of the way, saving them from a dangerous side impact.
(R.103 at 150, 198-90, 205.)
boys.

(Id.)

The lift chair still grazed one of the

The operator then hit the stop button and grabbed the

chair, helping to stabilize it.

(Id.)

If the lift operator had hit

the stop button first, both the boys and the appellant would still
have been hit by the chair because the lift, by design, stops slowly
in order not to eject the other lift passengers. (R.103 at 210, 266,
244, 297.)
The lift chair had begun swinging somewhat from its contact
with the boy and/or the lift operator.

However, lift chairs can be

loaded without incident when swinging mildly if the person loading
follows
grabbing

standard

procedure, turning

the pole

to

steady

the

back

chair.

toward
(R.103

the
at

chair and
197.)

The

appellant, an experienced skier, knew that proper loading procedure
was to turn and observe the approaching lift chair and grab the
chair's pole to stabilize the chair as he loaded. (R.103 at 63.)
In this instance, however, he failed to turn and look, and the chair
hit him in the back of the leg. (R.103 at 49-50, 59.)
There

is some question

as to whether

another person was

standing waiting to load with the appellant, but it is clear that
if there was such a person, he or she loaded successfully or merely
stepped aside and avoided any contact with the chair. (R.103 at 105106.)
6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court's findings of fact were not against the

great weight of the evidence, and should be affirmed.

Appellant

completely failed to marshal the evidence supporting the findings,
and cited only isolated portions of testimony which do not conflict
with the court's factual determinations.

Substantial evidence was

presented to show that Brighton acted reasonably in response to an
emergency created by two other skiers, and did not breach any duty
to appellant.
2.

As an alternative ground, the trial court's judgment was

appropriate in that appellant's cause of action arose out of the
negligence of other skiers, and was thus barred by the "inherent
risks of skiing" statute, Utah Code Ann § 78-27-53. Injuries caused
by the carelessness or recklessness of other skiers are an inherent
risk of the sport, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-53.
Couching a claim in terms of negligence does not remove the claim
from the coverage of the statute.
3.

The trial court properly awarded costs to Brighton.

Appellant's failure to raise any specific objections to Brighton's
memorandum of costs constituted a waiver of any such objections on
appeal.

Furthermore,

Brighton's

memorandum

of

procedurally sufficient to support the award of costs.

costs

was

While the

memorandum did not contain a jurat, it is undisputed that the
7

memorandum was duly sworn. A jurat is merely evidence that an oath
was taken, not part of the oath, and therefore its absence does not
invalidate a sworn document.
The

depositions

of

appellant,

Jason

Johnstone,

Jerry

Steinagel, Richcird Cummock and Dr. Gordon Kimball were reasonably
necessary;

consequently,

properly awarded.

the

costs

of

those

depositions were

Brighton concedes that the expert fee paid to

Newell Knight may not constitute a reimbursable cost, but submits
that appellant has waived any objection to the award.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT APPELLEE DID NOT
BREACH ANY DUTY TO PLAINTIFF IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE
AFFIRMED.
A.

Plaintiff Has Failed to Marshal All The Evidence Supporting
The Trial Court's Finding, Which Warrants Affirmance Of The
Judgment.
After a two-day bench trial, the trial court found that

appellee Brighton was not negligent in its reaction to the boys1
premature entry into the loading area. (R.88-89; see Addendum.) In
his brief, appellant challenges the Court's

factual findings,

apparently contending that the findings were against the weight of
the evidence.
This court has held on several occasions that

8

[an appellant], in challenging the trial
court's factual finding, must proceed in two
steps: The [appellant] must first marshal all
the evidence that supports the trial court's
finding, and then demonstrate that, despite
this evidence, the finding is so lacking in
support as to be "against the clear weight of
the evidence" and, thus, clearly erroneous.
Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah App. 1990).
When an appellant fails to so marshal the evidence, this Court will
"refuse to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and
accept the findings as valid."

Saunders v. Sharp, 135 Utah Adv.

Rep. 68, 70 (Utah App. 1990).

See also Smith, supra, at 1225;

Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 514 (Utah App. 1990).
In this case, as in Saunders, the appellant challenges the
trial court's factual findings, but ignores the evidence which
supports those findings.

Appellant sets forth only the testimony

which he claims supports his version of the accident.

Appellant's

approach is clearly contrary to the dictates of this court, and that
alone warrants affirmance of the judgment.

Because the trial

court's other grounds for finding no cause of action against
Brighton were expressly alternative grounds, the remaining arguments
in appellant's brief (except for Point III, concerning costs) may
be disregarded and should not be considered.

9

B.

The Trial Court's Findings Of Fact Are Supported By The
Evidence,
Standard of Review
A trial court's finding of fact will only be set aside by a

reviewing court if it is against the clear weight of the evidence,
or the reviewing court otherwise reaches a "definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made."

Smith, supra, at 1224.

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous "only if the finding is
without adequate evidentiary support or is induced by an erroneous
view of the law."

Id.
Argument

The evidence supporting the trial court's findings, including
inconsistencies in the testimony of appellant and his witnesses, can
only be summarized here.
cannot be addressed.

The demeanor and candor of the witnesses

As the Utah Supreme Court once observed,

It is the duty of this court to leave the
question of credibility of witnesses to the
jury or fact trier and we have quite
consistently adhered to that policy. As has
often been said, the jury is in a favored
position to form impressions as to the trust
to be reposed in witnesses. They have the
advantage of fairly close personal contact;
the opportunity to observe appearance and
general demeanor; and the chance to feel the
impact of personalities. All of which they
may consider in connection with the reactions,
manner of expression, and apparent frankness
and candor or want of it in reacting to and
answering questions on both direct and crossexamination in determining whether, and to
what extent, witnesses are to be believed.
10

Whereas, the appellate court is handicapped
by being limited to a review of an impersonal
record.
Gittens v. Lundberg. 3 Utah 2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115, 1117 (1955).
In this case, after a two-day trial to the bench, the trial
court found that Brighton had not breached any duty to appellant.
Far from being "without adequate evidentiary support," the court's
findings were compelled by the substantial evidence adduced during
the trial.
This case involves injuries allegedly incurred by appellant,
Nathan Hale, while he was waiting to load onto the Majestic Ski Lift
at the Brighton ski resort.

Construed in the light most favorable

to appellee, as it must be,1 the evidence at trial establishes the
following circumstances of the accident:
On February 12, 1988, Hale was with his son and his son's
friends on a church outing, skiing at Brighton. (R.103 at 15.) Hale
attended the outing to supervise the boys (R.103 at 5) , and had been
giving instruction to Jerry Steinagel, a 15-year-old boy who had
never skied before. (R.103 at 119.)

Steinagel and another boy,

Jason Johnstone, were immediately behind Hale in line to board the
lift. (R.103 at 111.) Instructions on boarding the lift were posted
at the lift line.

(Exhibits 22, 32.)

Despite the fact that

Lamkin v. Lvnch, 600 P.2d 530, 531 (Utah 1979).
11

Steinagel had never skied before, he received no instructions from
Hale on how to board the lift, (R.103 at 86, 120.)
As Hale's turn to load approached, he moved forward and stood
on the "load board" (a device embedded in the snow which marks the
loading location) in anticipation of loading onto the lift. (R.103
at 16.)

The boys behind Hale were not paying attention and/or

became confused.

Erroneously thinking it was their turn to load,

the boys proceeded into the loading area prematurely.

Both boys

originally testified that they thought the chair that hit Hale was
the chair they were supposed to load onto, and therefore they were
proceeding forward into the loading area:
A.

Okay. Mr. Hale advanced up here and stopped at the
loading point. And as the chair proceeded around,
there's a big wheel that the cable runs around.
Okay, he proceeded around here. Jerry and I just
had barely come through the gate and we advanced
a little far. And the ski lift operator — he came
running. He thought we were going to go too far
out of the gate, and we didn't go out of the gate.
He grabbed onto the chair with his left hand
wait, no, his right hand.

(Testimony of Jason Johnstone, R. 103 at 95-96.)
* * *

Q.

(By Mr. Winegar)
Jason, let me show you a
statement that was typed up right here. J. J. is
Jason Johnstone.
Do you recall this statement
being taken?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

Let me ask you the question that he asked you. He
asked you:
Okay.
What happened then, as you
recall? Is that correct?
12

A.

Can you repeat that, please?

Q.

Yes. He said:
recall?

A.

After this right here?

Q.

Can you read what your answer was?

A.

"Okay. Well, I had advanced up into the thing, up
into the gateway pretty fast, and the instructor,
you know, the —

Q.

Then he said lift operator?

A,

Okay.

Q.

What did you respond?

A.

" — the lift operator thought I was going a little
too fast, but I stopped right at the gate — at the
end of the gate, and he thought I was going to — "
Then there's a blank, and he said: Slow down.

Okay, What happened then, as you

. . .

Q.

(By Mr. Winegar) Okay. Then the interviewer said:
Now, that would be the chair ahead of you.
And what was your response?

A.

"The one that hit Nathan was going to be our
chair."

Q.

And he responded, "Okay"; is that correct?

A.

That's what it says.

(Testimony of Jason Johnstone, R. 103 at 107-08.)
* * *

Q.

Do you remember being asked similar questions to
that in your deposition last September?

A.

No, I don't.
13

Q.

Okay. That is a narrative, I asked you what you
said and you made several statements, and then can
you read your answer on line 2 0 of page 10, and it
goes on to page 11?

A.

Okay. "To get on the lift, Jason and I — to get
on the lift Jason and I were standing behind the
red line that said •stop.1 And Nate was going to
get on the chair, and we were just going to get on
the one following right following [sic]. But the
worker, I guess to be safe, he wanted us to wait
one in between, to skip one. So we started to
cross to get onto the following one, I guess.
"He said, 'Wait a second. ' And he came to guide
us back across the line. If I remember right, I
thought he grabbed the chair. He pulled us back
to stop us. . . ."

(Testimony of Jerry Steinagel, R. 103 at 121.)
* * *

Q.

Okay. And then the question, this is the background question: "And so you were coming out too
early; is that correct?" And what was your answer?

A.

"Well, the next chair was coming and the next one
was coming around. We were just going to get up
there ready to get on the next one, but he wanted
us not to get on the next one. He wanted us to
wait one more, the worker did, and so he didn't
want us to come out right, you know, and wait. He
just wanted us to stay there. And, of course, it
was my first time and I probably should have
waited, but I didn't know, and we just went
forward. That*s when he brought us back."

(Testimony of Jerry Steinagel, R. 103 at 124.)
* * *

THE WITNESS: "He [The operator] said — okay, he
didn't say anything. Just, you know, didn't say
anything until we stuck across the line at the same
time he was walking back and just said, 'You guys
14

wait. Just wait.1 He said that, 'just wait,1 and
pushed us back. We said, 'Okay,' and so we just
backed up."
(Testimony of Jerry Steinagel, R. 103 at 315.)
In essence, the boys ran a
emergency situation:

'stop sign' and created an

If they remained there, the lift chair would

hit them from the side, begin swinging, and then hit Hale also.
(R.103 at 150, 189-190.)

At the time the boys passed the "Wait

Here" sign, the moving lift chair was so close that it could not be
stopped without hitting both the boys and Hale:
Q.

Can you tell me what happened when Mr. Hale came
up?

A.

Sure. He came up to the loading area, just like
everybody else, and standing in the proper place
where you are supposed to stand. Everything was
running smoothly until the two kids that he was,
I guess, teaching how to ski or something, shot out
right as the chair was turning.

Q.

They shot out?

A.

They just kind of came out. They were not out far.
They were just out, I don't know, maybe a couple
of feet or so, just to where the chair would have
hit them. I could have hit the stop button. The
chair would have still slammed into them. The only
way to do it was to get them out of the way.

Q.

Were they in danger of being hit?

A.

They would have been hit. They would have been
hit. In fact, when I pushed them back, the chair
grazed the inside kid.

Q.

You physically pushed?

A.

You bet.

What do you mean by that?

15

Q.

If I can finish the question, did you physically
push one or both boys back across the line?

A.

Yes.

(Testimony of Robert Barton, R. 103 at 150.)
* * *

Q.

If the chair is coming around this far end of the
bullwheel here, is there any way, under any
circumstances, that it can be stopped as to avoid
a premature skier?

A.

No.

Q.

If the chair is coming around this corner of the
bullwheel, is there any way under any circumstances
that it can be stopped to avoid hitting the person
on the load board?

A.

No.

(Testimony of Mike Twede, R. 103 at 210.)
* * *

Q.

If a skier came into the load area early and the
chair hit the skier, what would be the result to
the chair?

A.

The skier being an immovable, or semi-immovable
object, the seat portion of the chair would ride
up that object, the person, until the person gave
way or until the chair got high enough it could go
over the top.

Q.

If the stop button was pushed as the chair came
around this corner into the B area, is it possible
to stop the lift before hitting an incoming skier?

A.

Now [sic] the chair would still be in motion.

Q.

And under the best of circumstances with the
heaviest load, is it still possible?
16

A.

The chair would still be in motion.

(Testimony of Theodore Jorgensen, R. 103 at 266.)
* * *

Q.

If the operator made the decision to stop under the
set of circumstances we have described, would the
chair hit the incoming skier?

A.

Yes, unless they stopped. As long as they are
coming in, and they have only got that two-foot
distance, it is going to get them.

(Testimony of Newell Knight, R. 103 at 294.)
* * *

Q.

Under the assumptions that I have given you, is
there any way that the stop button will prevent the
chair from hitting either the incoming skier or
skiers or the person on the load mark?

A.

There is not.

(Testimony of Newell Knight, R. 103 at 297.)
The lift stops slowly, as required by applicable standards,
so as not to eject skiers who are already sitting in chairs being
transported to the top of the hill. (R.103 at 180-181.)
The trial court found that the boys were negligent in entering
the load area prematurely and that the situation constituted an
emergency. (R. 88-89; see Addendum.)

The lift operator responded

to this emergency by pushing the boys out of the path of the chair,
then hitting the stop button and grabbing the chair in an attempt
to stabilize its swing. (R.103 at 151-152.)
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The decision of the

operator, which took place in about three quarters of a second
(R.103 at 286-287), saved the boys from certain impact with the
chair and potentially serious injury.
Despite the fact that the operator yelled a warning at the
boys (R.103 at 104, 152), despite the standard loading procedure
and express instructions to turn around to see and grasp the
approaching chair (R.103 at 197, and Exhibits 23, 32), and despite
the fact that Mr. Hale had turned around to see and grasp the
approaching chair for all of his skiing life (R.103 at 63), Hale
stood facing forward and did not see or grab the lift chair as it
came toward him.

The chair struck him on the leg from behind.

(R.103 at 63.)
There was some question in the testimony as to whether another
skier was standing next to Mr. Hale, but it is clear that if a skier
was there, the skier merely took a step to the side and was missed
by the chair, or loaded onto the chair without incident by using the
normal procedures of turning to see and grasp the chair. (R.103 at
105-06.)

Even when a lift chair is swinging, a skier can usually

board the chair by dampening the swing with an arm, as is the usual
practice. (R.103 at 197-198.)

Loading the chair lift is an easy

procedure if th€> skiers follow the basic illustrated steps posted
before the loading area.

(See Exhibits 22 and 32.)

In fact, the

process is so simple that in almost 18 years of loading and
18

supervising lifts, Brighton's lift supervisor recalled only 5 or 6
incidents involving injuries significant enough to be reviewed by
the ski patrol. (R.103 at 196.)
The lift chair struck Hale in the back of the left leg near
the knee and pushed him slowly forward, still standing on his skis.
(R.103 at 322-323.)

Hale was asked by several Brighton personnel

if he was injured, but stated numerous times that he was okay and
proceeded into the lodge to rest. (R.103 at 207, 234-235.)

Some

forty-five minutes later, Hale reported to the ski patrol first-aid
room, where he complained of a pain in his knee. (R.103 at 234-235.)
Pursuant to the ski patrol's standard practice, Hale was given
first-aid treatment, including a total body survey in which his
entire body was physically examined and he was asked if he had pain
in any other area. (R.103 at 209.) He stated that the only pain he
felt was in the knee. (R.103 at 238, 241-242.) He declined several
suggested first-aid treatments for pain in his knee. (R.103 at 244245.)
At trial, Hale testified that he began to have problems with
his back, hand and fingers, and leg shortly after the accident.
(R.103 at 23.) Hale had previous injuries to the same areas he now
complains of, but apparently "forgot" to tell his doctor about these
injuries when asked. (R.103 at 78-79; Exhibit 12.)
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The above testimony is not only that most favorable to the
appellee, but is also that which the trial court found to be true.
The trial court's findings were in accord with the great weight of
the evidence, and were further supported by the appellant's own
inconsistent and contradictory testimony.2
In his brief, Hale totally ignores the substantial evidence
which supports the trial court's findings, and cites only a few
items of testimony which he claims supports his version of the
accident.

The "contrary" evidence cited in appellant's brief does

not undermine the trial court's conclusion.

For example, the issue

of the ski lift operator's level of experience, which occupies
several pages of appellant's brief, is completely irrelevant to a
determination

of whether

the

operator

was

negligent

on this

particular occasion. A person may perform his duties perfectly his
first day on the job, or a twenty-year veteran may act negligently.

For example, shortly after the accident, Hale told Brighton
first-aid attendants that the incident arose out of the premature
entry by the boys.
(See Exhibit 27.)
Throughout the trial,
however, Hale maintained that the boys did not enter the loading
area early. Hale also testified originally that he heard the lift
operator yell a warning to the boys, and that the operator then ran
behind him.
(R. 103 at 60.) At trial, however, Hale did not
remember the warning, and said the operator ran in front of him.
(R. 103 at 60-61.)
Hale also could not decide whether he was
"crouched down" after being struck by the chair (R. 103 at 62-63)
or "knocked out" at the time. (R. 103 at 20, 62-63.)
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The boys1 testimony at trial that they did not enter the
loading area prematurely is also insignificant. The boys originally
testified under oath that they did enter prematurely (R.103 at 10607, 121, 126); Hale himself confirmed that fact in an accident
report filled out shortly after the incident (Exhibit 27) . The lift
operator also testified that the boys entered the load area early.
(R.103 at 150.)

The trial court simply found this testimony more

persuasive than the boys' conflicting trial testimony.
Similarly, it is immaterial whether or not Jason Johnstone
actually

overheard

a conversation

in which the lift operator

supposedly was criticized for his actions.
remembers the alleged conversation.

No one else heard or

Furthermore, even if such a

conversation did take place, that fact would be, at best, only some
evidence of negligence.

The trial court heard the evidence and

correctly concluded that the operator was not negligent.
Hale's final argument in opposition to the trial court's
factual findings is a claim that applicable American National
Standards Institute provisions governing ski lifts were violated,
which Hale apparently contends constitutes causative negligence as
a matter of law.

While Hale apparently is referring to trial

Exhibit 9, he has attached to his brief a copy of a document
recently obtained from the U. S. Forest Service, which "as far as
[he] know[s]," is identical to Exhibit 9. Appellee has not compared
21

the documents to determine whether the two versions are identical,
but submits that this Court should review Exhibit 9 itself, if
necessary, rather than a substitute which may or may not be
identical to the actual exhibit.
Contrary to Hale's wishful

assertion that

it is "quite

obvious" that the lift operator should have hit the stop button
before grabbing the chair, the testimony he cite establishes — at
most —

that pushing the stop button first was one option open to

the operator.
Additionally, as the trial court found, the operator was
confronted with an emergency situation, and therefore his conduct
must be judged accordingly. The operator cannot be found negligent
for exercising one of two or more reasonable alternatives, even if,
in hindsight, Mr. Hale believes one is preferable to another.

In

fact, the evidence showed that the boys and Hale would have been
injured if the operator had pushed the stop button first.

The

actions taken by the operator probably would have resulted in no
injury to anyone if Hale had simply turned and grasped the pole as
he should have.
Moreover, Hale's argument ignores the well-established rule
that statutory violations may be excused if the actor's conduct is
reasonable under the circumstances.
80, 82 (Utah App. 1987).

Jorgensen v. ISSA, 739 P. 2d

The trial court recognized that fact in
22

this case when he indicated that "the only question . . . in all of
the rhetoric is whether or not the reaction of the lift operator,
in doing whatever he did was negligent."

(R.103 at 370.)

Hale challenges the trial court's characterization of the
circumstances as an emergency by arguing that skiers entering the
ski lift area prematurely is not a unique circumstance, and in fact
is one of the hazards for which Brighton's lift operators are
trained.

Hale's argument overlooks the fact that the law does not

restrict the concept of an emergency to unique situations not
foreseeable to the actor.

Perhaps the best example is in the

context of automobile accidents.

On numerous occasions, the Utah

Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that a driver may be
faced with an emergency situation through the fault of another
driver, yet it cannot be said that such situations are unique, or
that operators of vehicles are not trained for such incidents and
cannot foresee them happening at some time.

See, e.g., Hillier v.

Lamborn. 740 P.2d 300, 302-03 (Utah App. 1987), and cases cited
therein.

On the contrary, on a highway, as in a ski lift area, it

is known that certain circumstances may occur which will create a
dangerous situation. Merely because that possibility is foreseeable
does not mean that the actor is not faced with an emergency.
The trial court heard the evidence for two days, and found
that Brighton did not breach any duty to Mr. Hale.
23

The isolated

portions of testimony cited in Hale's brief certainly do not compel
the conclusion that the Court's findings were "against the clear
weight of the evidence," particularly in light of the overwhelming
evidence supporting the findings.

Accordingly, the judgment should

be affirmed.
POINT II
HALE'S CLAIMS ARISE OUT OF AN INHERENT RISK
OF SKIING, AND ARE BARRED UNDER UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-27-53.
Standard of Review
As

an alternative ground

for

finding no cause

of action

against appellee, the trial court found that Hale's alleged injuries
were caused by the negligence of other skiers.

Consequently, the

court concluded that Hale's injuries arose out of an inherent risk
of skiing, as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-53.
The trial court's finding of fact may be reversed only if
clearly

erroneous.

Smith, supra, at 1224.

The trial

court's

interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-53 is a question of law
which is reviewed for correctness.

Western Fiberglass, Inc. v.

Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell. 789 P.2d 34, 37 (Utah App. 1990).
Argument
Because the trial court's finding of no breach of duty plainly
was not against the weight of the evidence, this Court need not
consider the alternative grounds for judgment cited by the trial
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court. In any event, however, the evidence and applicable statutory
language support the trial court's conclusion that Hale's cause of
action arose from an inherent risk of skiing, and is barred by Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-53.
Through two separate enactments, the Utah legislature has
expressly recognized that the sport of skiing has certain risks of
injury that are inherent to the sport.

In 1969, the legislature

adopted the Passenger Tramway Act, which acknowledged the state
policy of "protect[ing] its citizens and visitors from unnecessary
mechanical hazards in the design, construction and operation of
passenger tramways, but not from the hazards inherent in the sports
of mountaineering, skiing and hiking, or from the hazards of the
area served by such passenger tramways, all of which hazards are
assumed by the skier or other sportsman

..."

Utah Code Ann. 63-

11-37.
In 1979, the legislature further
clarif[ied] the law in relation to skiing
injuries and the risk inherent in that sport,
to establish as a matter of law that certain
risks are inherent in that sport, and to
provide that, as a matter of public policy,
no person engaged in that sport shall recover
from a ski operator for injuries resulting
from those inherent risks.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51.
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Under the "inherent risks" statute, such risks include, but
are not limited to, "impact with lift towers and other structures
and their components; collisions with other skiers; and a skier's
failure to ski within his own ability." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-52.
For proper application of the inherent risks concept in this
case, it is necessary to examine the language of the tramway act in
conjunction with the inherent risks statute.

In particular, the

language of the tramway act deserves particular attention as it
specifically addresses ski lifts. Utah Code Ann. § 63-11-38(5).
The tramway act specifies that, with respect to passenger
tramways, the policy of the state is to protect its citizens and
visitors from "unnecessary mechanical hazards" arising out of the
usage of a tramway.

(Emphasis added.) The act makes clear that the

state does not intend to protect skiers from the hazards inherent
in skiing, "or from the hazards of the area served by such passenger
tramways . . . "

(Emphasis added.)

Utah Code Ann. 63-11-37.

The legislature's use of the disjunctive "or" in the tramway
statute demonstrates that inherent risks of skiing include not only
those risks found on the ski slopes, but all risks inherent in the
sport of skiing.3

The only exception to the inherent risk concept

See also §78-27-52(1) ("'Inherent risks of skiing' means
those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of the sport
of skiing . . .")
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as applied to ski lifts is mechanical hazards arising in their
usage.

Plainly, not every accident involving a ski lift is caused

by a "mechanical" hazard.
Passenger

Tramway

Safety

For example, Rule 927-50-2H of the Utah
Committee

Regulations

states

that

"'Passenger Accident1 shall mean an accident resulting in either
death or injury requiring major medical attention to one or more
passengers on the tramway, but which did not involve a mechanical,
structural, or electrical failure or malfunction of the tramway."
Utah Admin. R. 927-50-2H (1989.)

Ski lift accidents not involving

mechanical hazards may thus constitute inherent risks of skiing.
To hold otherwise would be to contradict the express purpose and
language of the passenger tramway statute.
The fact that appellant's cause of action was couched in terms
of negligence does not compel a different result.
risks

statute,

§

78-27-53,

as

amended

in

The inherent

1986,

provides:

"Notwithstanding anything in § 78-27-37 through § 78-27-43 ["Utah's
comparative fault statutes! to the contrary, no skier shall make any
claims against, or recover from, any ski area operator for injury
resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing."
added.)

(Emphasis

The legislature, by reference to comparative negligence,

obviously envisioned that an inherent risk of skiing could encompass
allegations of negligence on the part of a ski operator or third
parties.
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In Grieb v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, 400 N.W.2d 653, 155 Mich.
App. 484 (1987), the plaintiff collided with another skier and was
seriously injured.
enacted

Michigan has a ski statute similar to that

in Uteih, barring

actions arising

necessary dangers of the sport.

out of obvious and

The plaintiff in Grieb attempted

to circumvent the inherent risk bar by alleging that the ski resort
was negligent in failing to prevent the skiers involved from "hot
dogging" in an unsafe manner. The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld
summary judgment for the ski resort, finding that, as a matter of
law, the plaintiff's collision with another skier fell within the
category of inherent risks of the sport of skiing.

The fact that

the collision allegedly was caused by the negligence of the ski
resort did not take the claim outside of the inherent risks statute.
Application of that principle to this case demonstrates that
Hale's suit is barred as arising out of an inherent risk of skiing.
There was no allegation that the lift was mechanically deficient.
Hale's injuries were caused by the negligent or reckless conduct of
other skiers in approaching the lift prematurely, forcing the lift
operator to take action to try to avoid an accident.

Among the

examples of inherent risks of skiing set forth in § 78-27-53 are
collisions with other skiers and the failure of a skier to ski
within his or her own ability.

By logical extension, an injury

caused by other careless conduct of fellow skiers or the injured
28

skier also falls within the category of an inherent risk.
The Utah legislature enacted § 78-27-53 to protect ski area
operators such as Brighton from lawsuits arising out of such
inherent risks.

Appellant quotes at length from the legislative

history of the act, arguing that it is inapplicable because it was
never intended to prevent claims where " . . . the operator was, in
fact, negligent . . . "

(Brief of Appellant at 32.) Appellant also

maintains that the operator " . . . has the responsibility to operate
his ski area in a non-negligent manner," and that the ski area must
". . . make sure that they don't operate in a negligent manner."
(Id. at 33).
Appellant misses the entire impact of the judgment against
him, however. The court specifically found that the resort was not
negligent in any way, and that Hale's alleged injuries were caused
by

other

skiers'

negligence,

which

participating in the sport of skiing.

is

an

inherent

risk

of

Consequently, the court's

determination that Hale's cause of action is barred by Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-53 should be affirmed.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS AWARD OF
COSTS TO BRIGHTON.
Standard of Review
The trial court's award of costs is reviewed on an abuse-ofdiscretion standard.

Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way, 753 P. 2d

507, 510 (Utah App. 1988).
Argument
A.

Appellant Has Waived Any Objections To Brighton's Memorandum
of Cost.
Appellant's so-called "Objection" to Brighton's memorandum of

costs consisted of a single sentence stating that appellant objected
to Brighton's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,
judgment, and memorandum of costs. (R. 94.)
were set forth for Hale's objection.

No specific grounds

Accordingly, under Utah Law,

Hale failed to preserve any such grounds for appeal.

Beehive

Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Sguare D Co.. 669 P. 2d 859 (Utah 1980);
Meyers v. Salt Lake City, 747 P.2d 1058 (Utah App. 1987).
The requirement that only specifically identified grounds for
objection are preserved for appeal follows logically from the wellestablished rule that issues not raised before the trial court are
not reviewable on appeal.

Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah

1987); Utah County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83 (Utah 1983).

In Mascaro,

supra, the Utah Supreme Court noted that application of the above
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B.

Brighton's Memorandum Of Costs W a s Procedurally Sufficient To
Support A n Award O f C o s t s .
H a l e d o e s n o t dispute that Brighton timely filed a memorandum

of costr
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MijI*1 concedes, however, that the

memorano < * i.-* costs state i:
. . i,,neqir , i^eing duly sworn, herej3y
verifies that to affiant's knowledge the items
below are correct, and that the disbursements
have been necessarily incurred j n this action
(R. 92 )
Ha I e's procedural argument hi nges entirely on t1inji cl.iim th.ii!
the memorandum was "never verified at the end "
mearp that U P ^-r

ihx i-* mil i inn iiii ii juial

Presumably1, Ha!-1
Uiin j it ed I y, tin1

U t a h Supreme Court has stated that for a valid verification,
1,1) there must be a correct written oath or
affirmation, ami (2) it must be signed by t h e
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affiant in the presence of a notary or other
person authorized to take oaths, and (3) the
latter must affix a proper jurat.
Mickelson v. Craiqco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1989).
Utah appellate courts have not considered the effect of
failure to include a jurat on an otherwise properly verified
document.

The majority of courts, however, hold that the omission

in itself does not invalidate a sworn document, because the jurat
is no part of the oath, but is merely evidence
of the fact that the oath was properly taken
before the duly authorized officer.
50 C.J.S. Jurat, p. 705.

See, e.g., Yang v. Stafford, 515 N.E.2d

1157, 1160 (Ind. App. 1987) (construing rule of court and common
law); American Home Life Insurance Co. v. Heide, 199 Kan. 652, 433
P.2d 454 (Kan. 1967); Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority v.
Zitko, 386 S.W.2d 69, 78 (Mo. 1964, en banc), Huff v. Commonwealth,
194 S.E.2d 690, 692-93 (Va. 1973).

That rule recognizes the policy

that form should not be elevated over substance, particularly when
appellant cannot show any prejudice.

In this case, appellant does

not

of

dispute

that

the

memorandum

costs

was

duly

sworn.

Consequently, the memorandum was valid, and costs were properly
awarded.
With respect to the specific cost items awarded, this Court
has noted that cost of depositions may properly be awarded if the
depositions were reasonably necessary. Lloyd's Unlimited, supra.
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As *

non-par*y. M"

interrogatorios

information provided by appellant concerning Mr. Cummock was a
"supplemental" interrogatory answer submitted approximately two
weeks before trial, in which Cummock was identified for the first
time as an expert witness.

The answer indicated that Cummock was

a "mechanical engineer" who would testify that the lift operator
should have pushed the stop button first. (R. 33-35.)

Plainly,

appellee could not reasonably be expected to go into trial with such
sparse information.
The deposition
appellant's

of Dr. Kimball was also necessitated by

inadequate

discovery

responses.

In

the

same

supplemental interrogatory answers, appellant stated that his future
medical expenses were unknown, but would be "substantiated by Dr.
Gordon Kimball." Again, Dr. Kimball could not be required to answer
interrogatories, and trial was less than two weeks away.

Dr.

Kimball's deposition was essential to enable appellee to adequately
defend Mr. Hale's damages claims.

Additionally, Dr. Kimball's

deposition was received in lieu of his appearance at trial. (R.103
at 72.)

Accordingly, the costs of Mr. Cummock and Dr. Kimball's

depositions were properly awarded.
As a final matter, Brighton concedes that the expert witness
fee of Newell Knight may not be compensable as a "cost" under
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980).

However, Brighton

submits that appellant has waived any objection to the trial court's
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